

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06TELAVIV2961, RES POL AMB DCM

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06TELAVIV2961**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06TELAVIV2961	2006-07-30 17:33	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Tel Aviv

Appears in these articles:

[not](#)
[yet](#)
[set](#)

null
Carol X Weakley 08/01/2006 02:37:21 PM From DB/Inbox: Carol X Weakley

Cable
Text:

C O N F I D E N T I A L T E L A V I V 0 2 9 6 1

SIPDIS
CXTela:
 ACTION: DAO
 INFO: RES POL AMB DCM

DISSEMINATION: DAO
CHARGE: DAO

APPROVED: DAO: WCLARK
DRAFTED: DAO: WCLARK
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCTVI713
RR RUEHC RHEFDIA
DE RUEHTV #2961/01 2111733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301733Z JUL 06

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-6//

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 02961

SIPDIS
CXTela:
ACTION: DAO
INFO: RES POL AMB DCM

DISSEMINATION: DAO
CHARGE: DAO

APPROVED: DAO: WCLARK
DRAFTED: DAO: WCLARK
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCTVI713
RR RUEHC RHEFDIA
DE RUEHTV #2961/01 2111733
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301733Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5272
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHO-6//

----- header ends -----

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002961

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PINR](#) [PTER](#) [KPAL](#) [KWBG](#) [IS](#) [LE](#)

SUBJECT: ZELIKOW AND GILAD DISCUSS TRAITS OF INTERNATIONAL
FORCE FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON, IDF PROGRESS, WAY AHEAD

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASONS: 1.4 (B
AND D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MG (RES) AMOS GILAD, ISRAELI MOD ADVISOR
FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, TOLD COUNSELOR ZELIKOW
29 JUL 06 THAT INTERNATIONAL FORCE MUST BE EMPOWERED TO
ENFORCE CEASEFIRE AS NECESSARY, TO DEPLOY FROM BLUE LINE
NORTH TO NAHR AL LITANI, IF NOT NAHR AL AWALLI, AND TO
TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. NOTED PROGRESS SHOWN TO DATE
AGAINST HIZBALLAH, MADE CASE FOR OPERATIONS SEVEN TO TEN
MORE DAYS TO HIGHLIGHT HIZBALLAH AS SERIOUSLY WEAKENED AND
TO DEAL WITH KATYUSHA THREAT. END SUMMARY.

EUROPEAN FEEDBACK ON INTERNATIONAL FORCE;
NOW ISRAEL'S TURN

¶2. (C) COUNSELOR AND SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR TO SECSTATE
ZELIKOW EXPRESSED TO MG (RES) AMOS GILAD, ISRAELI MOD
ADVISOR FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, HIS DESIRE TO
COMMUNICATE TO GOI CURRENT STATUS RE INTERNATIONAL FORCE
FOR SOUTHERN LEBANON FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN ROME,
BRUSSELS, LONDON, PARIS, AND ANKARA, AND TO FIND OUT WHAT
ISRAEL HAS ACHIEVED THUS FAR IN THIS CAMPAIGN, WHAT HER
FURTHER GOALS ARE, AND WHAT SHE NEEDS TO ACHIEVE THEM. IN
ISRAEL'S OPINION, WHAT ARE THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE, AND WHAT SHOULD THIS FORCE BE
EXPECTED TO DO? ZELIKOW REQUESTED A GRANULAR SENSE OF THE
SITUATION SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS
AS USEFUL AS IT CAN POSSIBLY BE.

WHAT ISRAEL HAS ACHIEVED TO DATE;
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE

¶3. (C) GILAD RESPONDED THAT THERE IS A GAP BETWEEN THE
IMAGE OF ISRAEL'S SUCCESS (I.E., LACK OF) AND THE REALITY

ON THE GROUND (MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN IS REALIZED). FOR EXAMPLE, GILAD CLAIMED, HAIFA WAS NOT ATTACKED TODAY BECAUSE HIZBALLAH NO LONGER POSSESSES THE CAPABILITY TO DO SO. 220 MM ROCKETS HAVE NOT BEEN FIRED FOR FOUR DAYS. TOO, ISRAEL DEALT HIZBALLAH'S STRATEGIC (LONG RANGE) ROCKETS CAPABILITY A BIG BLOW THROUGH THE USE OF SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE TO LOCATE LAUNCHERS HIDDEN IN HOUSES AND HIT THEM (PART OF THE PRE-PLANNED TARGET SETS) IMMEDIATELY ON THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. CURRENTLY, 50 PERCENT OF 220 MM AND FAJR 3 LAUNCHERS ARE DESTROYED FOLLOWING LAUNCHES. THUS, THE PERSONNEL WHO ARE EXECUTING THE LAUNCH HAVE COME TO REALIZE THEY HAVE A ONE IN TWO CHANCE OF NOT LIVING TO LAUNCH AGAIN. IDI PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NOW THAT THEY HAVE DESTROYED MOST OF THE ZILZAL LAUNCHERS (THIS ESTIMATE QUOTED AS BASED ON VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION), 80 PERCENT OF THE 220 MM LAUNCHERS, AND 60-70 PERCENT OF THE FAJR 3 LAUNCHERS.

14. (C) CONDUCT OF GROUND OPERATIONS IS MUCH EASIER GOING THAN JUST THREE DAYS AGO (A REFERENCE TO THE LOSS OF NINE SOLDIERS, EIGHT OF THEM AT BINT JUBAYL) AND CERTAINLY TWO WEEKS AGO. IN THE LAST 24 HOURS, 26 HIZBALLAH HAVE BEEN KILLED IN BINT JUBAYL, 70 TOTAL IN THIS TOWN OVER THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN. ESTIMATES ARE THAT JUST 30 HIZBALLAH REMAIN THERE. THESE 100 TOTAL HIZBALLAH (70 KILLED OVER THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN PLUS THE 30 THAT REMAIN ALIVE) ARE/WERE SPECIAL FORCES, HARD TO REPLACE, AND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF THE TWO SOLDIERS. ACROSS THE AOR, IDF HAS KILLED 50-80 HIZBALLAH IN THE LAST THREE DAYS. HIZBALLAH COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES HAVE BEEN DEALT SOME BLOWS, BUT ARE STILL FUNCTIONING. IDF ASSESSES THAT NASRALLAH IS FULLY BRIEFED AND CURRENT.

WHAT THE SHOOTING IS ALL ABOUT:
HIGH STAKES

15. (C) GILAD COMMENTED THAT THIS IS NOT A WAR BETWEEN HIZBALLAH AND ISRAEL, BUT RATHER BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AN EXTENSION OF IRAN. AT THIS MOMENT, SYRIA AND IRAN ARE ENCOURAGED. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE ARAB WORLD, THAT SHE HAS SUBSTANTIALLY WEAKENED HIZBALLAH MILITARILY (HE CONSIDERED THIS WOULD TAKE SEVEN TO TEN MORE DAYS), NASRALLAH WOULD EMERGE A HERO AND UNDERWRITE HAMASSTAN AND HIZBALLAHSTAN. SPECIFICALLY, SEVEN TO TEN DAYS WOULD ALLOW ISRAEL TO DEAL WITH THE KATYUSHAS. CONTRARILY, A CEASEFIRE TOO EARLY WOULD PRESERVE THE ACHIEVEMENT AND IMAGE OF HIZBALLAH AS HAVING STOOD UP TO ISRAEL. GILAD SAID THIS SCENARIO REMINDED HIM OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. "WE CANNOT END WITH THIS IMAGE. WE MUST FINISH." GILAD DID NOT CONFIRM THAT FUTURE LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS WOULD BE CONDUCTED TO "TAKE OVER THE LITANI", BUT HE SAID SUCH OPERATIONS WOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN FOUR DAYS IN HIS OPINION. HE OBSERVED THAT LARGE SCALE GROUND OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONS OF SPECIAL FORCES (SMALL UNITS) ACROSS VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN THE SOUTH COULD BE SEEN AS ONE IN THE SAME.

THE CHALLENGE

16. (C) ZELIKOW STATED THAT HIZBALLAH, POST HOSTILITIES, MUST BE PERSUADED THAT IT SHOULD HENCEFORTH SHUN MILITARY ACTION AND EMBRACE POLITICAL ACTION AS THE WAY AHEAD. GILAD RESPONDED THAT HIZBALLAH KNOWS IT IS WEAKENED MILITARILY, BUT IT IS MAINTAINING A BRAVE FACE. THE CHALLENGE IS TO INSURE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND THE WORLD COME TO KNOW IT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NO ONE WILL BELIEVE IT AS LONG AS 90 ROCKETS PER DAY LAND IN ISRAEL. ZELIKOW REMARKED THAT ISRAEL MUST POSITION ITSELF TO TELL A GOOD STORY PRIOR TO THE UN RESOLUTION - ISRAEL HAS DEALT THE AGGRESSOR, HIZBALLAH, A CRIPPLING BLOW. BUT, THERE IS A FINE LINE TO BE STRADDLED HERE. IF HIZBALLAH IS BEATEN UP TOO MUCH, THIS EFFORT WILL HAVE AN OPPOSITE, UNDESIRE EFFECT, I.E., SWING THE SYMPATHY VOTE, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE ARAB

WORLD, IN THEIR DIRECTION.

THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE CONCEPT

¶17. (C) ZELIKOW POINTED TO CORE REQUIREMENTS THAT MUST BE MET TO SUCCESSFULLY EXIT THIS CONFLICT - A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, RAPID INTRODUCTION OF LEAD ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE (THE REMAINDER OF WHICH MUST FOLLOW QUICKLY), AND FINALLY, A VIABLE CEASEFIRE. THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE MUST BE ONE THAT HIZBALLAH AGREES NOT TO ATTACK (OR IT WILL NOT COME), AND IT MUST HAVE ROBUST RULES AND BACKING WHICH DERIVES FROM A UN RESOLUTION THAT MANDATES DISARMAMENT AND NO ATTACKS ACROSS THE BLUE LINE. ALSO, GOL MUST UNDERSTAND THE ROLE THEY PLAY IN DISARMAMENT.

¶18. (C) GILAD RESPONDED THAT THE NEW MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE ABSOLUTELY MUST BE CHAPTER SEVEN OPERATIONS ELIGIBLE, RESEMBLE THE INTERVENTION FORCE OF NATO, AND MUST ESTABLISH A PRESENCE AT NINE DIFFERENT SYRIA-LEBANON BORDER CROSSINGS (SPECIFIC CROSSINGS TO BE PASSED AS FOLLOWUP) TO PRECLUDE IRAN AND SYRIA'S RESTORATION OF HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS INVENTORY FOLLOWING CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (OR ALL WILL HAVE BEEN FOR NOUGHT), AND MUST TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. HE COMMENTED THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD CLAIM TWO RELATIVE SUCCESSES - SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST AL QAIDA IN LEBANON AND AGAINST PFLP-GC. THESE PAST AREAS OF SUCCESS MIGHT PROVE CRITICAL IN FUTURE IF HIZBALLAH, IN THIS NEW ENVIRONMENT AND WITH NEW RULES OF THE GAME, LOOKS TO THE PALESTINIANS TO TERRORIZE IN THEIR STEAD. GILAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE THAT THIS FORCE, REGARDLESS OF BEDDOWN LOCATION, BE EMPOWERED TO ACT ACROSS ALL OF LEBANON IN ORDER TO DEAL PROPERLY WITH THE STRATEGIC LONG RANGE ROCKET THREAT. TURNING TO PERSONNEL MAKEUP, HE ENCOURAGED ARAB OR MUSLIM PARTICIPATION, PERHAPS TURKISH OR JORDANIAN, TO HELP LEGITIMIZE THE FORCE.

¶19. (C) ZELIKOW DESCRIBED THIS PROPOSED FORCE AS LESS RESEMBLANT OF AN INTERVENTION FORCE AND MORE A MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE WITHOUT A LEAD COUNTRY OR LEAD ORGANIZATION, SOMEWHAT BLURRY IN THIS REGARD, BUT WITH A REAL COMMANDER AND A REAL HEADQUARTERS. THE EU AND NATO MIGHT PROVIDE PLANNING ELEMENTS, THE BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIANS, AND SPANISH MIGHT PLAY ROLES, AND THE U.S. MIGHT SERVE AS ENABLERS (LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, AND AIR SUPPORT) FROM OFF SHORE. REGARDLESS OF END COMPOSITION, THIS FORCE MUST BE HIGHLY COMPETENT AND HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL. IF GOL, GOI, U.S., EVERYBODY BUT HIZBALLAH AGREES TO THE LAYING ON OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, THEN HIZBALLAH WILL REVEAL ITSELF VERY PUBLICLY AS THE PARTY STANDING IN THE WAY OF PEACE. ZELIKOW COMMENTED THAT SINIORA HAS REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS AND HAS A STRATEGY - TO TAKE AWAY HIZBALLAH'S EXCUSE IN LEBANESE POLITICS AND TO POLITICALLY ISOLATE THEM. SHAABA FARMS, HOWEVER, IS A NETTLESOME ISSUE.

¶10. (C) GILAD WORRIED THAT THE MONEY (IRAN WOULD PUT AN UNLIMITED BUDGET AGAINST THIS) THAT WOULD FLOOD INTO LEBANON POST CONFLICT WOULD NOT BE CONTROLLED PROPERLY AND THAT APPROPRIATE APPARATUSES SHOULD BE PUT IN PLACE TO DO SO. OTHERWISE, THE DAWA WOULD REBUILD THE SOUTH AND IRAN'S INFLUENCE WOULD PENETRATE EVEN MORE DEEPLY.

¶11. (U) COUNSELOR ZELIKOW DID NOT CLEAR ON THIS MESSAGE.